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Resumo
Optimização das Sinergias Civis-Militares na 
Gestão de Crises
Uma eficaz gestão de crises não é possível só 
com a utilização de soluções puramente militares 
e os deficientes resultados nalgumas operações 
exigem a todos os principais intervenientes uma 
eficiente e eficaz combinação de recursos milita‑
res. No entanto diversas organizações e países 
têm abordado esta cooperação de diferentes 
maneiras, não existindo um conceito unificado 
sobre a melhor forma de empregar de forma 
sinérgica recursos e capacidades civis e militares. 
A prática tem demonstrado diversas dificuldades 
na implementação desta cooperação, originadas 
por diversos motivos. É fundamental haver um 
entendimento comum sobre a utilização dos di‑
versos recursos civis e militares, que as diversas 
organizações e nações têm ao seu dispor, para 
se atingir o sucesso na resposta a crises, neste 
novo ambiente estratégico. E esse entendimento 
poderá passar por uma percepção comum sobre 
como resolver os problemas assim como por novos 
conceitos, doutrinas e procedimentos, a serem 
aplicados pelos diversos actores envolvidos na 
gestão de crises.
Abstract
It is recognized, conflicts cannot be overcome only by 
military capabilities. Setbacks in some operations put 
pressure on stakeholders to come up with common 
views on how to better combine civil and military 
capabilities. Different concepts and approaches to 
civil-military cooperation have emerged among 
international organizations and nations. There are 
some important obstacles and difficulties to develop a 
common understanding to coordinate and implement 
policies to cope with challenges of crisis response 
operations in the new strategic environment. Sharing 
of information between military and civilian actors is 
one of the fundamentals to have common situational 
awareness. This includes a good knowledge of military 
and civilian capabilities available to achieve common 
objectives. And the way forward is new concepts, 
organizations, procedures and training.
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Introduction
The changing nature of crisis management in terms of tasks means to address 
them, and actors involved has forced security actors to reconsider responses. 
Current and future operations call for an effective and synchronized planning and 
deployment of military and civilian capabilities at the onset of operations (ideally 
in the planning phase). The traditional sequence of military intervention in crisis 
management followed by a civilian presence to reconstruction is no longer valid. 
Availability of required capabilities and coordination of actions are the key words 
for success. Security, development, rule of law and good governance has to evolve 
in a coordinated manner to achieve success in crisis management operations.
This paper will address the optimal use of the civil-military synergy in the 
field of crisis management in four parts. The first one is a small introduction to the 
subject, the second is an overview of the reality in the cooperation between civilian 
and military organizations, the third some views on how to precede in a pragmatic 
approach and it concludes with some final remarks. It will focus on NATO’s deve-
lopments in comprehensive approach and civil-military cooperation.
Some	Concepts	(What	are	we	Talking	About?)
When we talk about coordination and synergy it is important, in our view, that 
language and terminology are precise so that all involved understand fully what 
is excepted. In that sense it is important to address concepts and definitions about 
Synergy, Comprehensive Approach and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). 
The term synergy comes from the Greek word syn-ergos, (συνεργός), meaning 
“working together” (Wikipedia). Synergy could be defined as a combined or coope-
rative action of two or more agents, either groups or parts that together increase each 
other's effectiveness. Synergy could also be defined as two or more elements functio-
ning together to produce a result not independently obtainable. So, to have synergy, 
the key words are cooperation (will), coordination of actions (work) and common 
purpose (end state).
Comprehensive Approach could be defined as the synergy of all actors and ac-
tions of the international community through the coordination and de-conflicting of 
political, development, and security capabilities to face today’s challenges (Weezel, 
p.62). This is a conceptual framework to describe civil military interaction. NATO 
uses the term to stress the need for the international community to improve co-
operation and coordination of crisis management tools, assets and resources.
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The Comprehensive Approach could also be defined as the cross-governmental 
generation and application of security, government and development services, 
expertise, and structures/resources over time and distance. This should incorpo-
rate partnerships with host nations, allied governments, and institution partners 
(Lindley-French, Cornish and Rathmell, 2010, 2). 
CIMIC is defined in NATO´s Allied Joint Publication 9 as “The co-ordination 
and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander 
and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well 
as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies” 
(NATO, 2003, 1).
Confusion should be avoided when refereeing the Comprehensive Approach 
and CIMIC. There is some relationship between both concepts but they are not the 
same. Where the Comprehensive Approach is a civilian political process, CIMIC is a 
military organization that facilitates cooperation between the military and civilians, 
especially at the tactical level.
The	Reality	Check
NATO’s experiences in missions and operations, most notably Kosovo and Afgha-
nistan, have demonstrated that in the framework of military operations, relationships 
between military forces, civilian authorities, populations, organizations and agencies 
are complex. It is recognized that peace, security, development and stability are more 
interconnected than ever placing a premium on close cooperation and coordination 
amongst international organizations playing respective roles in crisis prevention and 
management. As military action alone is insufficient to prevent or resolve crises/conflicts, 
success in current and future operations will require enhanced interaction amongst 
NATO and non-NATO actors at all levels, before and during NATO engagements. 
The concerted application of the instruments of power to resolve a crisis or conflict 
is not a new concept. It has been used by sovereign states since ancient times. Modern 
crises have been characterized by the increase in actors involved. The interaction 
between the major actors to achieve an effective resolution to a crisis or conflict is 
a challenge but is essential to reach a satisfactory outcome. NATO’s contribution to 
a comprehensive approach has received increased impetus following the Bucharest 
Summit in 2008 and the subsequent publication of a NATO Comprehensive Approach 
Action Plan and of the Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan addressing 
the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. In the Lisbon Summit 
the Heads of State and Government tasked the North Atlantic Council to update the 
NATO Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and its list of tasks. In that document, 
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approved by the nations, the NATO Secretary General’s Proposal on a Way Ahead 
on Comprehensive Approach (NATO/PASP, 2011, 14) states that:
“4. From an Alliance perspective, there are essentially three aspects to underpin 
a Comprehensive Approach:
4.1 improving the coherent application of the Alliance’s own crisis manage-
ment instruments, including its military and political planning procedures;
4.2 improving the Alliance’s practical cooperation at all levels with partners, 
the United Nations and other relevant international organizations, NGOs and 
local actors in the planning and conduct of operations; and
4.3  enhancing NATO’s ability to bring military support to stabilization operations 
and reconstruction efforts in all phases of a conflict. This aspect will aim at 
focusing on the operational implications of this endeavour, taking fully into 
account relevant work undertaken by the NATO Military Authorities.”
Another side of crisis management is that some times when dealing with 
responsive operations to a particular crisis situation (or in some war operations) 
the delineation of the problem (and the possible solutions) is considered a “wi-
cked problem”, due to its complexity. This concept of a wicked problem2, that it 
is not going to be expanded here, says that problem solvers cannot agree in the 
identification of the problem or its solution, differently from complex problems 
where them can agree on what the problem is but not in the possible solutions 
(Kramer, 2011, 82). This situation complicates cooperation and interaction of di-
fferent stakeholders’ engagement in crisis management operations. Nevertheless, 
in saying that wicked problems are difficult and with no clear solutions does not 
mean that they cannot be solved. They need a different analytical approach and 
a strong, collaborative engagement of stakeholders. They are the big strategic 
challenge to international organizations and nations in present and future crisis 
management.
The Problems
The cooperation amongst different stakeholders has experienced several dilem-
mas and has important challenges ahead. The organizations also have, in our view, 
strong incentives to cooperate. 
2  The terminology was originally proposed by H. W. J. Rittel and M. M. Webber, both urban 
planners at the University of California, Berkeley, USA in 1973.1 In a landmark article, the 
authors observed that there is a whole realm of social planning problems that cannot be suc-
cessfully treated with traditional linear, analytical approaches. They called these issues wicked 
problems and contrasted them with ‘tame’ problems.
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Some of the dilemmas of cooperation could be identified as follows:
•  The primary dilemma in cooperation is the issue of how to forge a fuller 
civil military partnership without compromising civilian control of security 
policy or undermining military effectiveness. This is an old issue in civil-
military relations theories and discussions. From a more purist approach 
that defends a clear separation of both functions to a more pragmatic 
approach that argues the military can perform constabulary missions in 
“hybrid defense” in close relationship with civil structures, several different 
positions could be discussed (Driver, 2011, 13-17). Competition has been a 
standing item in cooperation between military and civil organizations, both 
at international and national levels.
•  There is also a dilemma concerning cooperation between international actors. 
UN, EU and NATO do not share the same interests. In fact, they are often 
rivals in crisis management. Whereas the comprehensive approach concept 
is designed to facilitate coordination and links between international organi-
zations it seems that all discussions taking place on this concept are blurred 
naturally as everyone gain influence to increase his legitimacy or visibility, 
at the others expenses.
•  Other dilemma is neutrality and independence linked to humanitarian workers 
and judges, for example. Humanitarian workers want assistance to be neutral 
and autonomous to the population, and the judges want to remain independent 
wherever they are sent. The development, security and governance objectives 
are not always easy to reconcile in the minds of military, humanitarian actors, 
judges or politicians. 
•  A fourth dilemma is empowerment of the local actors, as international actors 
are still present in crisis management even more so with the comprehensive 
approach which handles all dimensions of a situation in an integrated manner. 
A number of crises, as Afghanistan or Somalia, demonstrate it is difficult to 
hand over to local actors because of corruption, drug use, illiteracy, etc. 
The main challenges for cooperation amongst different types of organizations 
(IOs, NGOs and at national level) are (UNDP, 2009):
•  Tackle Formalities: due to conflicting mandates and lack of memorandums 
of understanding, for instance;
•  Culture, mindset, prejudices: at national level between Ministries of Defense 
and Foreign Affairs, for instance. Or at international level between almost all 
the different IO;
•  Bureaucratic rigidity: despite wiliness to cooperate, no flexibility to adjust 
plans and budgets;
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•  Create a Culture of Coordination between civilian and military sides (inside 
IO – NATO, EU, UN)
•  Security : cooperation increases security of the actors involved;
• Funding: competing for founds is a zero-sum game;
• Priorities: organizations may share the vision, but not how to reach goals;
•  Resources: in some (all?) crisis management operations more resources goes to 
military, less for development – a balanced approach in resources allocation 
is needed or a better distribution as the operation evolves;
•  Leadership: the UN, or the strongest actor, or main donor country – this 
could be the most difficult challenge to address due to the fact that IO and 
NGO are not used to be under the control of others;
•  Authority : more decentralized authority is needed because eases cooperation 
at lower levels;
•  Local ownership: is a crucial factor for the exit strategies of nations and 
organizations involved in multinational crisis management operations.
Efforts for enhanced intergovernmental organizations cooperation are not unique 
for Kosovo but other areas of crisis. Moreover, these efforts are nowadays exceeding 
the realm of intergovernmental organizations and every day an increasing number 
in the academic community deal with this issue. Despite the competition we have 
experienced between main stakeholders (governments, IO, NGO and others) and 
not overcoming the challenges referred above we can see strong incentives for 
cooperation. This cooperation insures:
•  Efficiency: because it is important joining and coordinating scarce re-
sources;
• Consistency :‘the one hand should know what the other is doing’;
• Urgency: there is no great success in different missions around the world;
•  Security: failed/ weak states are becoming origin and training ground for 
terrorists and other threats;
•  Politics: electorates and constituencies in West are increasingly impatient for 
results; 
•  Legitimacy: more actors in the ground – moral and political legitimacy tend 
to increase. 
Also we have to address strong counter-incentives for cooperation. Cooperation 
and collaboration are time consuming, requires compromises and a willingness to 
dilute one’s own policy agenda. In weighting incentives and counter-incentives it 
is clear the incentives are preferred. 
We can see a strong disconnection between policy rhetoric concerning com-
prehensive approaches at the international level and policy realities in the field.
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How	to	proceed?
NATO Alliance, especially Allied Command Transformation (ACT), is producing 
a lot of good work in concepts and practical steps to improve the Comprehensive 
Approach increasing cooperation between military and civilian capabilities, along 
with IO and NGO’s. 
Interaction within the engagement space, the strategic environment in which 
the Alliance decides to engage, takes place over a wide spectrum. In accordance 
with ACT’s Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept (FCCMIC) 
enhancing Alliance’s ability to interact can be conducted by (ACT, 2008, 2): 
•  Promoting awareness of other players, based on principles of willingness and 
appropriate levels of mutual understanding.
•  Fostering de-confliction between actors, based on principles of information 
sharing, respect and transparency.
•  Bringing selected (and willing) actors together to co-operate on managing 
potential or current crisis through common analysis, shared interests and 
objectives.
•  Achieving coherence on a case-by-case basis characterized by collaborative 
planning and concerted action initiated at the political-strategic level and 
commenced at all levels.
These four different states clearly delineate the quality of the relationship between 
NATO and the non-NATO actors engaged in crisis management. 
Relationships between actors may take place along different points across the 
spectrum of interaction, and will vary dependent on the type and stage of a crisis. 
Ways to develop enhanced interaction amongst NATO and non-NATO actors could 
be as follows:
•  Encourage comprehensive planning and close working-level relationships 
between Alliance forces and appropriate non-NATO actors prior to or at the 
onset of a crisis as well as during contingency planning through continued 
implementation of policy and doctrine.
•  Find commonality of purpose within an engagement space to promote com-
prehensive, unified efforts as different instruments are applied to the crisis.
•  Formalize civil-military interaction mechanisms at all levels with non-NATO 
actors and within NATO and create cooperative arrangements as appropriate 
facilitating the delineation of tasks and responsibilities (e.g. by establishing joint 
strategic planning cells and/or by improving civilian planning capacity).
• Where appropriate, link interaction mechanisms with non-NATO actors to 
the NATO Crisis Response System and the Operational Planning Process. 
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Some Solutions
The top down approach to find a solution to problems has shown to be a slow 
process that does not fit with the urgent needs on the ground. However, on the other 
side, strategic and political ambiguity at top level guidance puts greater emphasis on 
the individuals that lead the process at operational and tactical levels, where political 
room for initiative is needed. So an implementation of more practical approaches at 
tactical and operational levels is required. For that purpose appropriate delegation 
of authority (and resources) is needed on the senior military and civilian officials 
in theatre. Integrate small and medium projects with direct impact in security and 
living condition of populations are an important step for reaching operational and 
strategic objectives. More training opportunities in civil-military cooperation are 
also needed, at all levels, in all organizations to have a more efficient articulation 
of military and civilian capabilities.
Information sharing between military and civilian actors is a fundamental factor 
to have common situational awareness of the engagement space during crisis mana-
gement operations. Information sharing and interoperability are also key enablers 
for complex operating environments. This includes a good knowledge of military 
and civilian capabilities available to better achieve common objectives. We need 
doctrines, concepts, organizational changes and new procedures; more training and 
education opportunities are needed to build on the required capabilities. 
Doctrine and Concepts
NATO should continue to work with international stakeholders in building 
common concepts and doctrines. Speaking the same language is mandatory to have 
common situational awareness and to better tackle the problems.
Allied Command Transformation is producing concepts in an attempt to provide 
solutions to the main problems in civil military cooperation. One good example is 
the reference of Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept which 
aims to enhance NATO’s ability to interact with other stakeholders. 
Organization and Procedures
NATO, at Brussels headquarters, would settle the Crisis Management Fusion 
Centre to better cope with the needs of information sharing and situational awa-
reness in a crisis. Another example is the Civil-military Fusion Centre designed 
to address the information management problems by operating a web tool that 
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allows information sharing and interaction between various stakeholders inte-
rested in a particular crisis, which allows a better Civil-military overview. Both 
centres proposals are inserted in the Concept for Information Sharing and Shared 
Situational Awareness between Civil and Military Actors produced also by ACT 
in 2008 (ACT, 2008)
At lower levels, tactical experience, experiments and exercises, as ARRC Project 
Tardis, have led to several lessons learned and/or proposals like the following 
(Lindley-French, Cornish and Rathmell, 2010):
•  Command and Control in Stability and Reconstruction (or Hybrid) Ope-
rations: a model of effective and flexible command and control should be 
applied by NATO strategic commands able to reach out to key civilian 
partners.
•  The need to harmonize Headquarters practices and Standards Operational 
Procedures: Allied Command Operations should take the lead in deter-
mining how NATO Force Structure headquarters’ practices and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP) should be harmonized on the basis of the 
experience, experiments and lessons learned. This should apply also to 
tactical composite HQ in missions and operations (KFOR and ISAF amongst 
others).
•  Subject Matter Experts: NATO´s Subject Matter Experts (SME) are needed both 
at the top level structures and within operational and tactical headquarters. 
NATO needs to build civilian capabilities within its structures including 
theatre HQs. This will require systematic access, at short-notice, to relevant 
expertise. These aspects are already included in the “Updated list of tasks 
for the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the 
Lisbon summit decisions on the Comprehensive Approach” (NATO/PASP, 
2011, 6).
•  Civilian Advisory Cluster: An effective Command Group at strategic, opera-
tional and tactical levels would ideally include a Strategic Communications 
Advisor who would be a civilian from outside the formal structure in support 
of the Public Affairs Office (PAO) as part of a civilian cluster able to reach 
out to external expertise and influence. 
Training, Exercises and Education
Training, education, experiments and exercises are good mechanisms of confidence 
building because they stimulate and develop mutual understanding between people 
and organizations. Training and exercises allow refinement of procedures through 
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the lessons learned mechanisms and is a good tool to improve local stakeholders’ 
capabilities.
ACT has issued the Strategic Guidance for Comprehensive Approach Training 
emphasizing the need for a “top-down” approach to merge with the existing “bot-
tom-up” approach. 
Implementation of CA in training should be considered along the following steps:
•  Dialogue: Establishing a permanent dialogue between civil and military 
actors, closely resembling the reality encountered in an operational envi-
ronment. 
•  Interaction: Creating an environment where civil and military actors interact 
as they do in theatre. 
•  Participation: Establishing comprehensive training events that incorporate 
civil actors’ inputs at the exercise design and planning phases. 
•  Integration: Conducting comprehensive training events in which each par-
ticipating organization has decision-making authority during the design, 
planning, conduct and lessons learned process. 
Joint civil-military training (at national and international levels) is identified 
as one of the key tools to overcome some of the organizational and human chal-
lenges to the implementation of Comprehensive Approach to crisis management. 
Joint training should not be seen as an end state, but it must be based on a correct 
evaluation of the needs for skills and knowledge.
The Multinational Experiments, a program lead by United States Joint Forces 
Command and with participation of other organizations, agencies and nations 
are also an essential tool providing opportunities to explore new concepts and 
capabilities for multinational and interagency operations. These capabilities in-
clude a “whole of government” comprehensive approach to harmonize civilian 
and military efforts on a multinational basis. Each event in this multinational 
experimentation program is designed to provide well-founded recommendations 
to senior leaders, and to deliver validated innovations to the practitioner, both 
civilian and military.
Capability Building
Without sufficient and effective military and civil capabilities there is no chance 
to have synergy in its application in the comprehensive approach to crisis mana-
gement. Lack of some required military and civilian capabilities is one of the main 
problems for IO and nations addressing solutions to crisis management operations. 
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Dual use technologies are an interesting approach to seek synergy in civil-military 
capability development.
As said before an important aspect of the NATO´s Future Comprehensive 
Civil-Military Interaction Concept, particularly for nations, is its implication for 
the development of capabilities. It is expected that it will impact development of 
associated capabilities as follows:
•  Civil-military interaction will be elevated to the status of a critical enabler 
for all military missions and operations wherein all doctrine must consider 
and anticipate the implications of interaction with non-NATO actors across 
all domains; 
•  Institutionalizing interaction will require broad policy and doctrine for NATO 
internal civil-military interaction that encompasses the various instruments 
of the Alliance such as linking NATO Civil Emergency Planning policy with 
that of NATO military doctrine;
•  Enhanced current organizational practices to achieve an overarching alignment 
of tasks, responsibilities, and, where necessary, structures within NATO;
•  Education and training will increasingly require the consideration of invol-
vement of non-NATO actors relevant to the Alliance’s efforts. Wherever 
possible non-NATO subject matter experts should participate and contribute 
to education and training, based on relevant and well-developed training 
serials;
•  Materiel that enables interaction and that is interoperable with relevant non-
NATO actors will need to be developed and/or procured;
•  Senior level political military consultation, planning and decision making 
will facilitate broader interaction;
•  Permanent access to a wider array of non-military expertise will be ne-
cessary;
•  Enhanced information centres, possibly based on existing Alliance structures 
and arrangements, need to be developed as knowledge hubs in support of 
comprehensive civil-military interaction;
•  The requirement for increased information sharing at all levels may necessi-
tate revision of current security arrangements, data protocols and Standard 
Operating Procedures (ACT, 2007, 4-5). 
European Union (EU) is fully engaged in capability development and it is im-
	  Capabilities are comprised of one or more of the following components: Doctrine, Organization, 
Education & Training, Materiel, Leadership Development, Personnel, Facilities and Interopera-
bility.
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portant that both organizations, NATO and EU, closely cooperate to have synergy 
in this area.
Since 2000, the European Union has been developing civilian capabilities for 
use in civilian missions, including post conflict and other environments. The EU 
has deployed civilian experts in a variety of capacities to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo 
and elsewhere. Given the fact that some would still prefer to see the EU remain 
purely a civilian power, it is important to note that the development of EU civilian 
capabilities should not become a substitute for development of European military 
capabilities. Focusing on EU civilian capabilities may be an attractive option finan-
cially and politically within Europe; European leaders must be careful to avoid 
misleading European citizens into the belief that these capabilities negate the need 
for continued investments in traditional military training and hardware.
Indeed, if the Common Security and Defense Policy is to improve the security of 
European states, and offer European leaders the flexibility that is its root justifica-
tion, it will be crucial to not only develop civilian capabilities, but also to continue 
and accelerate the long-standing effort to reform European national militaries so 
that they can deploy to conduct missions across a new spectrum of tasks. Europe 
should develop the capability to offer protection to civilian-military missions wi-
thout the need to rely heavily on NATO for protection – as they effectively have 
in both Kosovo and Afghanistan.
Final	Remarks
There is no miracle solution or silver bullet to have effectiveness in the Com-
prehensive Approach, for the time being, due to present obstacles and constraints. 
The lack of coherence and coordination among diverse international and local actors 
in the international conflict management system has resulted, inter alia, in inter-
agency rivalry, working at cross purposes, competition for funding, duplication of 
effort and sub-optimal economies of scale. Lack of deployable and usable military 
and civil capabilities is a real problem that only a coordinated and integrated ca-
pability development process of the main IO and its member nations can ease. The 
real truth is that Crisis Management is not a priority in a nation’s foreign policy. 
However we need to be pragmatic finding solutions at the tactical and operational 
levels that allow commanders and senior civilian officials to work together. Also 
we need a top down approach to have a better management of the processes at 
lower levels, creating appropriated doctrines and organizational changes, for ins-
tance. Achieving a functioning culture of cooperation is more important in relations 
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between IOs than implemented formal structures. Training is an important tool to 
enhance the culture of cooperation and is needed from the onset of an operation or 
even before a crisis occurs. Only addressing the root causes of a problem we can 
find cooperative solutions using different capabilities in synergy. Until we achieve 
this we must rely on the goodwill and experience of the stakeholders (military and 
civilians) at operational and tactical levels. This is good but in some cases could 
not be enough for success. 
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